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ABSTRACT
To measure how policy changes affect social welfare, economists typically look at how policies
affect behavior, and use a formal model to infer welfare consequences from the behavioral responses. But
when different models can map the same behavior to very different welfare impacts, it becomes hard to
draw firm conclusions about many policies. An excellent example of this conundrum is the taxation of
addictive substances such as cigarettes. Existing empirical evidence on smoking is equally consistent with
two models that have radically different welfare implications. Under the rational addiction model,
cigarette taxes make time consistent smokers worse off. But, under alternative time inconsistent models,
smokers are made better off by taxes, as they provide a valuable self-control device.
We therefore propose an alternative approach to assessing the welfare implications of policy
interventions: examining directly the impact on subjective well-being. We do so by matching information
on cigarette excise taxation to separate surveys from the U.S. and Canada that contain data on self-
reported happiness. And we model the differential impact of excise taxes on those predicted to be likely
to be smokers, relative to others, in order to control for omitted correlations between happiness and excise
taxation. We find consistent evidence in both countries that excise taxes make predicted smokers happier.
This evidence suggests that the time inconsistent model of smoking is more appropriate, and that as a
result welfare is improved by higher cigarette taxes.
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gruberj@mit.edu mullain@mit.edu   To measure how policy changes affect social welfare, economists typically look at how 
policies affect behavior.  They then use a formal model to infer welfare consequences from the 
behavioral responses. The advantage of this approach is that many behaviors can be readily 
measured in easily available micro-data sets.  The disadvantage is that the model used to make 
this inference is often empirically unverified.  Since different models can map the same behavior 
to very different welfare impacts, it becomes hard to draw firm conclusions about many policies.  
An excellent example of this conundrum is the taxation of addictive substances such as 
cigarettes.  There is wide agreement that consumption of cigarette is fairly price sensitive 
(Chaloupka and Warner, 2001).  But this fact is equally consistent with two very different models 
of why people smoke. Under the rational addiction model pioneered by Becker and Murphy 
(1988), agents decide to smoke in the same way they decide on other things: they trade off the 
long-term costs of smoking against the immediate pleasures all the while taking into account the 
addictive properties of nicotine.  In such a model, taxes will reduce smoking but will also make 
smokers worse off: the price of a good that they enjoy is more expensive.  
An alternative class of models suggests that smoking decisions are not made optimally.  
For example, in the model of Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002), time inconsistent smokers have 
self-control problems: they would like to quit smoking but cannot. In this model, a rise in taxes 
also reduces smoking. But now the reduction in smoking makes smokers better off: the higher 
taxes provide a commitment device that helps them deal with their self-control problem.   
These models have very different policy implications.  Under the rational addiction 
model, the only reason to tax cigarettes is the presence of interpersonal externalities. Under the 
more behavioral model, optimal taxes can be quite high, even absent interpersonal externalities, 
due to the self-control benefits of taxation.  Critically, since consumption can be price sensitive   
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under both models, existing evidence based solely on smoking behavior does not allow one to 
distinguish the correct model for welfare and policy analysis.
1 
In this paper, we go beyond the existing literature to propose a new approach. We do so 
by drawing on a source of data that is sometimes used in other disciplines but rarely by 
economists: data on self-reported happiness.
2 In principle, happiness is a direct welfare measure 
that can overcome the limitations of other approaches to welfare analysis of policies such as 
excise taxation.  This measure has been repeatedly validated as a good correlate of well-being, 
using alternative psychological, physiological, and economic measures of well-being.  Since the 
two models above make very different predictions of how taxes ought to affect happiness, this 
data allows us to distinguish between them in a way that traditional behavioral data cannot.  
We use two independent data sets to examine the effect of cigarette taxes on happiness. 
These are the General Social Survey’s (GSS) that are carried out in the United States (since 
1973) and in Canada (since 1985).  Both surveys repeatedly ask a random sample of respondents 
to report on their well-being.  In addition, the survey also contains information on a host of other 
demographic variables and, in many years, on smoking behavior.  
To assess the effect of taxes, we match these data to cigarette exercise tax data in each 
country.  In both the US and Canada, states and provinces have independently changed their 
taxes over time, giving us significant variation to estimate the effect of cigarette tax changes on 
self-reported happiness.  However, looking at how these tax changes affect happiness in the state 
                                                 
1 Gruber and Koszegi (2001) lay out a possible test of time consistency using high frequency data on cigarette 
consumption, but this test is unlikely to be feasible given existing data. 
2Easterlin (1974) provides an important early exception.  Recent examples of work by economists using happiness 
data include Blanchflower and Oswald (1996), Clark and Oswald (1994), and DiTella, MacCulloch and Oswald 
(2001) and Easterlin (1995).   
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or province as a whole would cause problems if other factors are changing along with these 
taxes. We, therefore, examine how tax changes differentially affect the happiness of those in a 
state who are predicted to be smokers. This strategy in essence uses those who are predicted to be 
non-smokers as a way of controlling for other shocks contemporaneous with cigarette tax 
changes. 
Our results are striking: those who are predicted to be smokers are significantly happier 
when excise taxes rise.  The fact that this conclusion emerges so clearly in two independent data 
sets, with different distributions of underlying happiness indicators, is quite striking.  In both 
countries, the estimated effects appear surprisingly large.  This evidence is very robust to a 
battery of specification checks across both countries.  And our findings are inconsistent with two 
alternative explanations for our results, interpersonal externalities within the family, and long run 
impacts of taxes in a time consistent setting.  Overall, our findings are consistent with time 
inconsistent models of smoking and provide early evidence that cigarette taxes may serve to 
actually increase the welfare of smokers themselves.    
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we discuss the alternative predictions for the 
impact of cigarette taxes on happiness, the models that underlie those predictions, and the 
importance of assessing the impact of cigarette taxation on welfare, in terms of optimal 
government policy.   In Part II, we discuss the use of subjective well being indicators as a 
measure of welfare.  In Part III, we discuss our data source and our empirical strategy.  Part IV 
presents basic results and our battery of specification checks.  Part V then explores two 
alternative explanations for our findings: intra-family externalities and long run averaging.  Part 
VI concludes.   
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  Part I: Smoking Behavior and Policy 
The key question that we propose to assess in this paper is whether cigarette taxation 
raises or lowers the happiness of potential smokers.  In this section, we expand on why cigarette 
taxation might have either positive or negative effects on happiness.  We then discuss the strong 
differences in government policy implied by these different models. 
Cigarette taxes will decrease happiness among smokers under the rational addiction 
model of Becker and Murphy (1988).  Becker and Murphy model the act of smoking as the 
building of an addiction stock. The more cigarettes smoked today, the greater the addiction 
capital tomorrow.  High addiction capital lowers average utility but raises the marginal utility of 
smoking.  In this way, smoking lowers future utility but also increases the craving for another 
cigarette.  The key feature of any addiction model is on how people deal with this intertemporal 
problem.   In the original Becker-Murphy formulation individuals discounted the future 
exponentially, meaning that they discount k-periods forward by δ
k, where δ is the per-period time 
discount factor.  Since an exponential individual makes a time-consistent choice to smoke, a rise 
in taxes can only lower discounted utility today.  If it were to raise it, then the rational addict 
could raise utility by simply reducing smoking by the amount that the tax does, i.e. by emulating 
the tax.  So cigarette taxes should reduce the happiness of time consistent rational addicts. 
Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002) develop an alternative to the Becker and Murphy model 
where smokers can actually be made better off by cigarette taxation.  Their alternative embeds 
within the Becker-Murphy stock addiction framework preferences that are time inconsistent, 
following Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).  In this quasi-hyperbolic 
formulation, next period is discounted by βδ, the following period by βδ




k, where β<1 is an extra discount factor that changes the discounting of this period 
relative to the entire future.  The key feature of such a hyperbolic model is that individuals will 
have self-control problems.  Specifically, a sophisticated hyperbolic individual (one who knows 
that he discounts hyperbolically) would like to smoke less in the future than he actually can. The 
problem arises because he is patient about the future (the relative discount rate between future 
periods is δ), but impatient about the present (the relative discount rate between today and 
tomorrow is βδ<δ).  This means that when the future arrives he will end up making more 
impatient choices (i.e. smoke more) than he would like to from today's vantage point.  
As Gruber and Koszegi show, the discounted utility of a sophisticated hyperbolic 
consumer can rise if a tax is imposed.  The reason is that the tax serves as a self-commitment 
device.
3  By forcing a reduction in the smoking in the future, the tax allows the sophisticated 
hyperbolic agent to do something they would not be otherwise be able to do.
4 This is the essence 
of the empirical test carried out below: a positive impact of cigarette taxation on the present 
discounted value of happiness is the direct implication of a sophisticated time inconsistent 
model. 
Existing empirical evidence on smoking, reviewed in Chaloupka and Warner (2001) and 
Gruber (2001), does not distinguish between these models.  There is a strong consensus that 
smoking is moderately price elastic, but agents are price elastic under either of these models.  
Gruber and Koszegi (2001) find that smokers respond not only to the current price, but also to 
next period’s price in their smoking decisions.  They show, however, that this tests only the non-
                                                 
3As Gruber and Koszegi (forthcoming) discuss, this government-provided commitment device is valued by 
consumers because the private sector cannot plausibly provide true commitment.    
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myopia condition that is present in both the rational addiction and their alternative model; this 
test has no implications for the time consistency aspect which strongly differentiates the models.   
There is a large body of evidence to support the notion that agents are time inconsistent, 
in particular with regards to their smoking decisions.  Laboratory experiments document 
overwhelmingly that consumers are time inconsistent (Ainslee, 1992).  In experimental settings, 
consumers consistently reveal a lower discount rate when making decisions over time intervals 
further away than for ones closer to the present, raising the specter of inter-personal conflict over 
decisions that have implications for the future. 
In the context of smoking, there is indirect evidence for time inconsistency that is 
reviewed in Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002).  A hallmark of sophisticated time inconsistency is 
the use of self-control devices.  And there is substantial evidence that self-control devices are 
frequently employed to quit smoking; people regularly set up socially managed incentives to 
refrain from smoking by betting with others, telling others about the decision, and otherwise 
making it embarrassing to smoke (Prochaska et al., 1982).  Various punishment and self-control 
strategies are recommended by both academic publications (Grabowski and Hall, 1985) and self-
help books (CDC, various years).  Such self-control devices are not needed by a time consistent 
agent; while such an agent would obviously like to make quitting as costless as possible, 
lowering the utility of an undesired alternative is irrelevant for decisionmaking. 
An alternative formulation of time inconsistency is the naive case, where individuals do 
not recognize their own self-control problems (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).  One feature that 
distinguishes naive time-consistent agents from time-inconsistent agents is an inability to realize 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Of course, a sophisticated time inconsistent consumer’s first choice would be a tax that started next period, but   
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desired future levels of smoking.  In fact, unrealized intentions to quit at some future date are a 
common feature of stated smoker preferences. Eight of ten smokers in America express a desire 
to quit their habit (Burns, 1992). Among high school seniors who smoke, 56 percent say that they 
won't be smoking five years later, but only 31 percent of them have in fact quit five years hence.  
Moreover, among those who smoke more than one pack/day, the smoking rate five years later 
among those who stated that they would not be smoking (74 percent) is actually higher than the 
smoking rate among those who stated that they would be smoking (72 percent) (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 1994). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gruber and Koszegi show that even a tax that starts this period would make time inconsistent smokers better off. 
This set of evidence paints a compelling case that many decisions, and in particular 
smoking, are not time consistent.  This is particularly true when one acknowledges that there is 
absolutely no evidence, experimental or otherwise, for time consistent preferences as a better 
explanation for laboratory or real world phenomenon than are time inconsistent preferences.  
But none of this evidence meets the gold standard for economics testing, which is to test the 
hypothesis through revealed behavior in response to a real change in the underlying economic 
environment.  Unfortunately, that may be a standard that is almost unreachable given the 
similarities between the models.  Thus, whether higher cigarette taxes will make smokers better 
or worse off remains an open question. 
  Understanding the impacts of cigarette taxes on well-being is not simply a matter of 
intellectual curiosity; these different models also have radically different implications for  
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government policy.  Under the rational addiction model, there is no rationale for government 
regulation of addictive bads other than interpersonal externalities.  Just as the government has no 
cause, absent market failures, for interfering with revealed preference in the realm of non-
addictive goods, there is no reason to take addictiveness per se as a call to government action, if 
individuals are pursuing these activities rationally.  It is this framework that implicitly underlies 
the well-known efforts of Manning et al. (1989) and others to measure the external costs of 
cigarette and alcohol consumption.  These estimates, which are frequently cited and influential in 
debates over excise taxation, suggest that the optimal tax rate for cigarettes in particular is fairly 
low, since the net external costs of smoking are small.  In particular, most estimates of the 
externalities from smoking are well below the existing average level of excise taxation (Gruber 
and Koszegi, 2002).
Gruber and Koszegi (2002) explore in detail the implications for government policy of a 
introducing time inconsistent, quasi-hyperbolically discounted preferences into the Becker-
Murphy framework.  In the Gruber and Koszegi model, the optimal excise tax is greater than zero 
even absent externalities, due to the self-control benefits to time inconsistent agents. Calibrations 
show that this point is not a theoretical curiosity, since the “internalities” (damage to the smoker 
himself) of smoking are so large, at over $35 per pack when accounting for mortality effects 
alone (calculated using the impacts of smoking on length of life and standard estimates of the 
value of a life from Viscusi, 1992).  They find that the optimal tax in their model, even with very 
modest time inconsistency, is well over $1 per pack, above and beyond externalities.
 5 
                                                 
5 Gruber and Koszegi (2001) also extend this analysis to show that a time inconsistent formulation has radical 
implications for the incidence of cigarette excise taxation.  Since lower income groups, either on a current or 
permanent income basis, are more likely to smoke, traditional analyses have viewed cigarette taxes as regressive.   
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It is important to note that not all alternatives to the rational addiction model deliver the 
prediction that smokers will be made better off by higher cigarette taxes.  For example, in the 
temptation models of Bernheim and Rangel (2001), agents do not behave in a rational time 
consistent fashion; they have different preferences over “tempted” and “untempted” states.  But 
there is by definition no price elasticity in the “tempted” state, so that higher prices serve no self-
control purpose; thus, higher prices only make them worse off.  Similarly, in the model of Gul 
and Pesendorfer (2000), there is a direct disutility from being tempted; but, so long as the agent 
can afford the product which is tempting them, there is no reduction in this disutility from higher 
prices.  Even in the model of Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002), time inconsistent but naïve 
consumers, who have a self-control problem but don’t recognize its existence, would not be 
made better off in their own eyes by higher taxation; such consumers view themselves as time 
consistent, so that by the same logic as above they would feel worse off from a tax-induced price 
rise.  Social welfare, discounted exponentially, may rise when taxes increase on naïve hyperbolic 
smokers, but their own perceived welfare will not increase. 
 
Part  II: What does Happiness Measure? 
Our methodology relies on using subjectively reported happiness measures in empirical 
work.  But how much can such measures be trusted?  Economists worry about the validity of 
such questions and to some extent the scientific evidence supports these worries (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2000). A large array of evidence has shown that subjective survey questions are 
                                                                                                                                                             
But when such taxes play a corrective role, as in the time inconsistent formulation, the incidence is reversed for a 
wide class of parameter values.  This is because both the higher smoking rates of lower income groups and their 
greater price elasticities imply a greater corrective benefit to them from higher taxation.  
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prone to significant reporting error. For example, studies have found that the placement of well-
being questions affects how they are answered.  If they are preceded by a question, for example, 
that asks about dating behavior, people are more likely to report unhappiness.  Beyond order 
choice, instantaneous mood at the time of survey is also found to have a large effect on how 
people answer such questions. Schwarz and Strack (1999) provide a nice survey of these effects.  
Yet such results only tell us that there is measurement error in these questions. There is 
also measurement error in the numerous other variables that economists study. What is more 
relevant for our purposes is that the evidence is clear that these questions also contain significant 
true signal about well-being. Evidence of this kind comes in several varieties but they all follow a 
similar methodology: find a more objective measure of well-being and see how well this measure 
correlates with the self-report. And strong positive correlations have been found for a large set of 
such variables.  For example, outsider’s assessments of a person’s happiness or independent 
counts of smiles correlate positively with self-reported happiness.  Moving to much more 
physiological measures, everything from heart rate, blood pressure, skin resistance measures of 
responses to stress, to even level of activity in the left versus right prefrontal lobe all are found to 
correlate with subjective reports of well being (Kahneman 1999; Gardner and Oswald, 2001). 
These studies all suggest that despite the measurement error inherent in this attitudinal question, 
it nevertheless correlates effectively with well being.
 6 
                                                 
6 A more subtle concern raised in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) is that the measurement error may be correlated 
with other variables. This makes it hard to assess whether something is affecting happiness or simply the 
measurement error in happiness. But in our framework, for this to drive our results, the measurement error in 
happiness would have to change in specific states coincident with cigarette taxes and in such a way that it only 
affects those with high predicted smoking. It is hard to see how his could be driven by the considerations cited in 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) as generating correlated measurement error, considerations such as cognitive 
dissonance and social reference effects.  
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Moreover, the small happiness literature in economics also has uncovered interesting 
patterns further bolstering the idea that these variables in fact measure well-being.  In cross-
sections, happiness generally rises with factors that economists would associate with improved 
well being, such as higher incomes.  The income effect appears to be causal, as it is present for 
lottery winners and those receiving inheritances (Gardner and Oswald, 2001).  Self-reported 
well-being is also lower for the unemployed, and for those who are divorced (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2000); interestingly, however, the reduction in happiness due to unemployment is 
mitigated when there is a larger “reference group” of unemployed (Clark, 2000).  Despite the 
increased use of this measure, there has been no attempt to date of which we are aware that uses 
these subjective well-being measures to attempt to either distinguish models of behavior, or to 
draw welfare conclusions about particular tax or spending interventions.  As a whole, therefore, 
the available evidence suggests that while subjective well-being measures do contain noise, they 
also contain significant signal and are a fruitful area for empirical exploration.
7 
 
  Part III: Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data 
We use two data sets to measure happiness, the General Social Surveys (GSS) from the 
U.S. and from Canada.  The U.S. GSS is a nationally representative survey in the United States 
that has been administered to 1500 to 2500 households in most years since 1972; we use data 
                                                 
7 It is also important to note that subjective questions may be eliciting two different notions of “well being”.  In 
economic terms, they might be eliciting the Present Discounted Value of all future utility or simply the flow utility of 
today.  For our purposes, it is not important which is being elicited.  The sign of the effect is informative for us in 
either case.  The distinction could be important, however, in studies that are much more reliant on specific 
magnitudes rather than signs.  
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from 1973 (the first year where state identifiers are available) through 1998.   The Canadian GSS 
is a nationally representative survey of Canadians that has been administered sporadically since 
1985; we use all available surveys that include a happiness question (1985, 1986, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1996, and 1998).
8  Both surveys ask a variety of standard economics questions, but their 
use has mostly been in other disciplines, since the survey’s main focus is on questions not 
traditionally used by economists: attitudes towards current events or political parties; religious 
devotion; and psychological measures such as happiness.  It is the last measure that forms our 
key dependent variable.   
In particular, in each year the U.S. GSS asks respondents “Taken all together, how would 
you say things are these days -- would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy”?  The Canadian GSS question asks “Would you describe yourself as very happy, 
somewhat happy, somewhat unhappy, or very unhappy”, and there is also an option for “no 
opinion”.   Since only a very small share of the sample responds that they are very unhappy or no 
opinion, we combine those responses with somewhat unhappy to form our unhappiness 
category.
9 
Another advantage of both surveys for our purposes is that both surveys have been carried 
out for many years.  Over the time periods covered there have been enormous changes in the real 
excise tax rates charged by the states and the Canadian provinces, absolutely and relative to each 
                                                 
8 The U.S. GSS survey is a random sample and requires no weighting, but the Canadian GSS is not nationally 
representative unless weighted, so that all of our regression estimates use survey weights. 
 
9 The wording of the Canadian question changes somewhat over time.  In 1986, the question adds “Presently, would 
you describe yourself as…”, and the 1991 and 1996 surveys add “usually, would you describe yourself as…”.  These 
wording changes appear to affect the distribution of responses across the very and somewhat happy categories, but 
do not impact the share of the sample saying that they are unhappy, which is the category upon which we focus.  Any 
overall impacts from wording changes will be captured in the year dummies included in the regression.  
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other.  It is these changes that provide the identifying variation for our model.  Data on state 
cigarette excise taxes come from the publication The Tax Burden on Tobacco.  We use state 
excise tax values as of February of each year, as the GSS data were collected over the February-
April period.  Data on Canadian tobacco taxes were collected by Gruber, Sen and Stabile (2002), 
and incorporate both federal and provincial excise and sales taxes on cigarettes.  We use the tax 
rate as of the month of the survey, since the Canadian GSS was collected in various months of 
the year over time. 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables in both data sets.  The 
first three columns show the GSS data from the US, and the second three columns show the data 
for Canada; in each set of columns, we first show the means for all respondents, and then 
separately by smokers and nonsmokers.  We use three dummy variables as our dependent 
variables for measuring happiness, corresponding to the three possible answers to the happiness 
question above.   Over our entire sample, in the United States 32% of respondents report 
themselves to be very happy, 55% are pretty happy, and 12% are not very happy.  In Canada, 
however, we see a different distribution: only 5% of the people report being unhappy, 34% report 
being “somewhat happy” and 59% report being “very happy” (with 2% missing).  These 
differences are consistent with the literature reviewed earlier, which discusses the sensitivity of 
the happiness responses across countries or types of wording.  But the consistent impacts of 
cigarette taxation we will see in both countries below confirm that these differences do not 
interfere with our tests.  
Both data sets collected data directly on smoking behavior, but only periodically.  In the 
U.S. GSS, these smoking data were collected from 1977 to 1993; in the Canadian GSS, they  
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were collected in 1986, 1991, and 1996.  In those years, 35% of the U.S. sample reports 
themselves as smokers, which is consistent with prevalence rates over this time period; in the 
Canadian data 30% report smoking.   Table 1 also summarizes the data sets based on whether the 
person reports being a smoker, a non-smoker and whether the data is missing.   Smokers are 
somewhat less happy than average in both data sets. While this consistent with the notion that 
they would like to quit but cannot, it is equally consistent with heterogeneity in smoking behavior 
by underlying happiness. 
The average real (in 1999 dollars) excise tax rate on cigarettes in the US is 31.6 cents, 
with a standard deviation of 15.8 cents, while in Canada it is 1.17 Canadian dollars, with a 
standard deviation of 39 cents.  There is wide variation in excise taxes across states, over time, 
and within states over time; 25% of the variation in excise taxes in the United States, and 32% in 
Canada, is within states/provinces over time.  This allows us to control for fixed state/province 
differences in cigarette taxes and happiness in our analysis below, as well as time trends in both. 
Table 1 also shows the means for the key control variables used in our analysis. Some 
interesting features are worth noting. Smokers are less educated.  For example in the United 
States, they have a high school dropout rate of 33% compared to 25% for non-smokers. They are 
also more likely to be unemployed and less likely to be out of the labor force, although this likely 
largely reflects the fact that the smoking rate is much higher among males.  We have endeavored 
to use as much as possible a common set of control variables in the two data sets, but the 
available variables are not identical (e.g. there are no consistent labor supply measures in the 
Canadian GSS). 
Finally, income is available only categorically in the U.S. GSS, in fine gradations until  
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the top of the income distribution, then in larger intervals and finally a top code.  In order to 
create a smooth income measure, we have used data from each year’s Current Population Survey 
to impute values to each of these larger ranges and the top-coded range.  Income is measured 
continuously in some years of the Canadian GSS, and in categories in other years; in the latter set 
of years, we use the midpoint of the income ranges (or 1.25 times the top value for the upper 
range).  In the regressions in each country we control for quartiles of the real income distribution. 
 In Canada, but not in the U.S., data are available on both personal and household income, so we 
include measures for both types of income. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
Let Hijt be the happiness of individual i who lives in state j at time t, and Tjt be the real 
level of cigarette taxes in state j at time t.  A simple regression that relates happiness to cigarette 
taxes in the state would be:  
(1) Hijt = α + βj + ηt + δTjt 
where βj are state fixed effects and ηt are year fixed effects, respectively.  These fixed effects 
completely control for any fixed differences between states and between years, which means that 
only within-state variation in cigarette taxes is used in the estimation.  Though it deals with many 
of the obvious endogeneity problems inherent in using state policy, this approach may still have 
problems.  For example, if states are changing cigarette taxes at different points in their state 
business cycle, the estimated ``effect'' may instead reflect the effect of these economic conditions. 
Another potential omitted factor from this model is the state spending (or reduced other taxes) 
that is financed by cigarette taxation.  If we find that higher cigarette taxes lead to a general rise  
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in happiness that could simply reflect the fact that these revenues are used in a welfare-enhancing 
way.  Finally, we have the fact that only about a third of our sample smokes on average, so an 
impact for smokers could be masked in the full sample. 
To address this problem, we exploit the fact that cigarette taxes should only affect the 
happiness of those who are smokers (and former smokers).  We can therefore compare the effect 
of taxes on this group to taxes on those who do not smoke.  We cannot do so by using direct data 
on smoking behavior, for three reasons: smoking decisions are endogenous to tax rates; the 
happiness effect in our model should operate through both current and former smokers; and 
smoking data are only available for a subset of years in both surveys.  We therefore compare the 
impact of excise taxation on predicted smokers.   
Specifically, we first estimate a regression that relates smoking behavior to the observable 
predictors of smoking we see in the GSS data.  Most of the variables are available in both 
countries, but some are available only in one or the other; we used the broadest set of covariates 
possible to generate the best possible prediction of smoking behavior.  Our predictors are: age 
category and gender interactions; household income quartile dummies; personal income quartile 
dummies (Canada only); education categories (high school dropout, high school graduate, some 
college, and college graduate); education of the respondents mother and father (by the same 
categories; U.S. only); race (white, black, and other; U.S. only); marital status (married, 
divorced/separated, widowed, never married); dummies for number of children (U.S.) or 
household size (Canada); dummies for full time work, part time work, unemployed, out of labor 
force, and whether ever worked (U.S. only); religious attendance (8 categorical values in U.S. 
that rise monotonically with attendance; three dummies for weekly, monthly, or annual  
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attendance in Canada); born in Canada; live in house or apartment (Canada only); own your 
house (Canada only); language spoken at home (Canada only); and the state/year or 
province/year unemployment rate. We estimate such an equation for each year that has smoking 
information, and use that to form a predicted probability of smoking (PREDSMOKijt).
10 
We then estimate equations of the form: 
(2) Hijt = α + βj + ηt + δTjt + θPREDSMOKijt + γTjt*PREDSMOKijt + ζXijt 
where the coefficient of interest is now γ.  So we are now asking whether deviations in cigarette 
taxes from their state-specific mean cause a relative change in the happiness of predicted 
smokers relative to those unlikely to smoke.  We also include the set of covariates, X, that were 
used to predict smoking, and which may have independent effects on happiness, as well as a full 
set of state and year dummies (and, for Canada, month dummies, since some of the Canadian 
GSS surveys are carried out throughout the year and we want to capture any seasonality in survey 
responses). 
We create dummy variables for the various happiness responses described above, and use 
those as our dependent variables.  We estimate linear probability models for ease of 
interpretation; probit estimates are similar.  In estimating all our equations, we adjust the 
standard error to allow for both auto-correlation and the grouped data, as suggested by Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullainathan (2001).  We do this by performing a White correction that allows for an 
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within states. 
 
                                                 
10 In years before the first smoking information is available (1973-76 in U.S.; 1985 in Canada), we use the first 
available year of information to form the prediction.  In years after the last smoking information is available (1994-
98 in U.S.; 1998 in Canada), we use the last available year.  In years between, we interpolate from years that have the  
 
18
Part IV: Results 
Basic Results  
Table 2 shows our basic findings. The first three columns focus on American Data, while 
the second three focus on Canadian data.  Each regression is an OLS estimate of (2), including 
covariates, where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating which level of happiness people 
chose.  Where the covariates used are the same in both countries, we use one row for both 
regressions; where they differ, we use separate rows for the U.S. and Canadian cases. 
In the U.S. data, cigarette taxes have a positive but insignificant effects on the probability 
of predicted smokers answering “very happy” or “pretty happy”.  It has a negative and very 
significant effect on the probability of answering “Not happy”. Specifically, the interaction term 
between the predicted smoking variable and the tax rate in column (3) is significantly negative. 
This suggests that cigarette taxes especially reduce unhappiness amongst those predicted to be 
smokers.  Our estimated effect here is that each penny of excise taxation reduces unhappiness by 
0.156 percentage points among predicted smokers.  Given that the effect is focused on reduction 
in unhappiness, we focus on this variable for the remainder of our U.S. analysis. 
  In the next three columns, we examine the effect of Canadian tax changes on happiness in 
the Canadian data.  Strikingly, we once again find that higher cigarette taxes make predicted 
smokers happier.  Taxes raise the probability of predicted smokers answering “very happy”, 
while reducing the probability of them answering “somewhat happy” or “unhappy”.   Once again, 
the statistically most significant effects are found here for unhappiness, where we find that each 
cent of excise taxation lowers the odds of being unhappy by 0.048 percentage points.  To parallel 
                                                                                                                                                             
smoking information.  
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the U.S. analysis, we focus on this unhappiness measure for the rest of the paper. 
There are two ways to gauge these magnitudes.  The first is to contrast the impact of 
excise taxation to other predictors of happiness.  For example, the results in columns (3) and (6) 
suggest that being a predicted smoker with no excise tax raises unhappiness by 7.5 percentage 
points in the U.S. and by 9.6 percentage points in Canada.  Thus, our findings suggest that a 50-
cent real excise tax on cigarettes would leave predicted smokers as happy as those not predicted 
to be a smoker in the U.S., and that a $2.00 real excise tax would have that effect in Canada.   
Alternatively, we find that, conditional on all other Xs, being in the top income quartile 
reduces unhappiness by about 7.5 percentage points (relative to the bottom income quartile) in 
the U.S., and by about 6 percentage points in Canada (incorporating the impact of being in the 
top quartile of both family and personal income). So a 50-cent (in the U.S.) or $1.33 (in Canada) 
excise tax would have the same effect.  In other words, such an excise tax level would be 
equivalent to moving a predicted smoker from the bottom to the top income quartile.
Both of these exercises imply very large impacts of excise taxes on happiness.  But one 
difficulty with these types of comparisons is that the effect of the X variables themselves on 
happiness may not be well identified.  While the impact of cigarette taxes on the happiness of 
predicted smokers is, we argue, a well identified relationship, the same cannot necessarily be said 
of the impact of factors such as income on happiness; those who are richer may be fundamentally 
less happy for other reasons, for example, understating the impact of income on happiness.  A 
better comparison may be to consider what these results imply for the implications for happiness 
of reducing smoking.  Estimates of the impact of excise taxes on tobacco expenditures are 
generally in the range of -0.5, although Gruber and Koszegi (2002) obtain a higher elasticity of  
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roughly -0.6 using more recent data.  Gruber, Sen and Stabile estimate an elasticity for Canada  
of –0.45. 
These estimates suggest that each 10 cent increase in price leads to a 6% decline in 
smoking in the U.S. (given the base average real price of 97 cents over our sample period) and a 
3% decline in smoking in Canada (given the base average real price of  $1.67).  Our happiness 
regressions suggest that this tax rise is also associated with an decrease in 1.5 percentage points 
of happiness amongst all those who are predicted smokers in the U.S., or roughly 10% of 
baseline unhappiness among smokers, and 0.46 percentage points among those who are predicted 
smokers in Canada, or roughly 7.6% of baseline unhappiness among smokers.  Extrapolating, 
then, these findings suggest that reducing smoking by 60% would fully remove unhappiness 
among smokers in the U.S., and that reducing smoking by 40% would fully remove unhappiness 
among smokers in Canada. 
These implied effects are once again quite large.  At the same time, the data reviewed 
earlier suggests that smoking is a very negative influence in the lives of many smokers so it is 
plausible that there could be large effects on happiness from smoking reduction.  Nevertheless, 
given these large magnitudes, we turn next to specification checks to demonstrate that the 
estimates are robust.  
Comparing the results across the countries suggests that a similar level change in taxes 
has a much smaller effect in Canada than in the US.  One possible interpretation of this could 
come from the higher level of base prices in Canada, relative to the U.S.  Given these high taxes 
already in place in Canada, the remaining pool of smokers may be those with the largest self-
control problems.  These smokers may need much larger tax changes to dissuade them from  
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smoking.  This contention is consistent with the fact that the elasticities of smoking with respect 




In Table 3, we further explore the sensitivity of our findings to concerns about omitted 
state variables that might be correlated with cigarette excise tax policy, focusing on the 
“unhappy” variables in both countries.   In the first column, we show our basic results from Table 
2 for comparison. In the second column, we interact the state/year unemployment rate with 
PREDSMOK, to capture any differential impacts of the cycle on the happiness of predicted 
smokers and nonsmokers; this has no impact on our estimates.  In the third column, we include 
state-specific linear time trends to capture any slow-moving trends in tax policy and happiness 
that might confound our results; including these trends raises the estimates in both samples.  In 
the fourth column, we interact a time trend with the predicted smoking measure, to allow for 
separate trends in well-being for predicted smokers and nonsmokers; once again, there is little 
impact.  In the fifth column, we interact each state dummy with PREDSMOK to allow for the 
effect of predicted smoking to vary by state; this reduces the estimate somewhat in the U.S., but 
raises it in Canada.  Overall, our findings are reasonably robust to these controls for slow-moving 
trends in the data or heterogeneity in populations across states. 
In Table 4, we address a different worry: that our happiness result arises through the 
spending financed by cigarette excise tax increases.  Suppose, for example, that government 
spending is more redistributive than excise taxation, or at least valued more by the types of  
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individuals who are predicted to smoke.  Then our finding could reflect the happiness effects of 
spending, not excise taxation.   
To address this point, we have gathered data on three other state or province taxes: the 
excise taxes on gas and alcohol, and the state or province sales tax rate.
11  We have also gathered 
data on state or province real revenues per capita.
   If this is a spending effect, so long as cigarette 
excise revenues are spent in a similar fashion to other tax revenues, then we should see a similar 
happiness effect from these other taxes.  We therefore add to our regression specification these 
tax variables, as well as their own interactions with predicted smoking. 
In column (1), we see the effect of the beer tax, in column 2, the effect of the gas tax, in 
column 3 the effect of the sales tax and in column 4, the effect of total state revenues.  In all four 
cases and in both countries, we see that the inclusion of these variables does not much affect the 
initial estimate of the cigarette tax.  Moreover, the new interaction terms with other taxes 
themselves are never negative and significant, although, for the U.S., there is a marginally 
significant negative effect of revenues per capita.  For Canada, the interactions with gas and sales 
taxes are actually positive and significant, suggesting that higher tax rates on those items raise 
unhappiness among predicted smokers.  This may reflect the fact that these regressive taxes are 
targeted to those low income persons most likely to smoke.  But, if anything, they suggest a bias 
against our finding for cigarette taxation.  Thus there is little evidence that it is spending of tax 
money (rather than the tax itself) that is affecting smoker happiness.   
Yet another possibility is that cigarette taxes are somehow spent differently than other 
                                                 
11 The sales tax rate in both countries is an ad valorem rate; the gasoline tax is cents per gallon in the U.S. and cents 
per litre in Canada; the alcohol tax is dollars per case of beer in the U.S. and ad valorem rate in Canada.  All dollar 
tax rates are expressed in real terms.    
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kinds of taxes, so that there remains a happiness effect through the revenue side.  We have 
investigated this possibility by gathering data on the composition of public spending over the  
1977-1999 period, decomposing total spending into spending on: educational services, social 
services, transportation, public safety, environment and housing, government administration, 
utility expenditures and other spending.
   We then regressed each of these spending categories on 
the different taxes to determine whether the marginal effect of cigarette taxes was different than 
the other taxes we have studied.  No significant pattern was found.  This suggests that differential 
spending of cigarette tax revenues does not drive our results. 
 
Part V: Alternative Interpretations 
These results so far are consistent with a time inconsistent model. But could they also be 
consistent with the time-consistent model? On the surface they are not, but with some 
reinterpretations they can be.  One possibility is to argue that it is not smokers who are made 
happier but instead the spouses and relatives of smokers.  Since our identification strategy 
compares predicted smokers to predicted non-smokers, our estimates would also include this 
externality effect if spouses and relatives have similar background characteristics.  They would 
then also appear to be predicted smokers.     
Of course, if higher taxes made family members better off, then this would indicate 
another potential failure of the standard model: imperfect family utility maximization.  That is, 
by the same logic that shows that time consistent smokers cannot be made better off by a higher 
tax, families of smokers cannot be made better off by a higher tax if the smoker was maximizing 
family utility.  If family utility was being maximized, and family members were better off with  
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less smoking, then smoking would have already fallen.  But this is a very different type of failure 
than that discussed earlier, so it is important to distinguish whether this is driving our results. 
We investigate this possibility in two ways in Table 5. First in columns (1) through (6), 
we separately examine the effect by marital status and gender.  If our effects are due to individual 
internalities, there is no a priori reason to believe the self-control problem ought to be greater for 
any particular group (holding constant the predicted level of smoking).  If, on the other hand, our 
effects were due to intra-family externalities, one would expect differences. Specifically, one 
would expect married people to show bigger effects since they are more likely to experience the 
externalities of smoking.  Moreover, since men smoke more, wives should experience a bigger 
externality than husbands.   
In Table 5, we therefore separately estimate our baseline model for married versus single 
people and then for four different groups: married men, married women, single men and single 
women.   In the US data, there is some evidence that married people show a bigger effect, and 
that the effect is indeed largest for married women.  In the Canadian data, however, the largest 
effect is for single men and the effects for singles are much larger than the effects for marrieds.  
Thus, the variation across groups seems essentially random and unrelated to the externalities 
story. 
In columns (7) through (8), we examine this possibility in a different way.  In the U.S. 
data, which has information on spousal education and labor supply, we estimate spousal 
predicted smoking as a function of the same set of covariates as above, but using the spouse’s 
education and labor supply in place of the respondent.  This allows us to separately include the 
predicted smoking of the spouse and it’s interaction with the tax; unfortunately, this exercise  
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cannot be carried out in Canada due to the paucity of information on spousal characteristics.  In 
fact, we do find some weak evidence for a role for spousal smoking in determining own 
happiness.  The interaction of spousal predicted smoking and the tax is negative and marginally 
significant for all married persons; that is, married couples where the spouse is more likely to 
smoke are also made marginally better off by the tax.  But the inclusion of this term has no effect 
on our key estimated interaction of respondent predicted smoking with the tax.  Thus, within-
family externalities appear unable to explain our results. 
There is a further complication with interpreting these results as evidence for a time 
inconsistent model, however, which is much more fundamental.  The key differential prediction 
between the time consistent and inconsistent models is over the immediate impact of taxation on 
the present discounted value sum of utility.  But, in fact, we do not measure the present 
discounted value of utility, only happiness at a point in time.  This makes interpretation of the 
results somewhat more complicated.  For a time consistent consumer, the effect of taxes on 
today’s utility is clearly negative, but the effect on future happiness can be positive.   This is 
because reducing smoking today can raise future utility.  Put another way, the tax inducing him 
to reduce smoking is analogous to an investment in which he bears a cost today (immediate pain 
of withdrawal) and reaps a benefit in the future (higher utility tomorrow).  Even though the net 
effect of this investment on utility is negative, when appropriately discounted, the long-run effect 
will be positive. On the other hand, the sophisticated hyperbolic consumer is made immediately 
better off by a tax, since they are pleased to have this commitment device made available.   
  The problem is that our existing test does not measure the immediate impacts of the tax, 
but rather the average impacts over time.  Since we are regressing current happiness on current  
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taxes, our estimated coefficients include the immediate effect of taxes on happiness. But if taxes 
are correlated over time, they will also include the lagged effect. Specifically, the more 
auto-correlated are cigarette taxes, the more the estimated effect in equation (2) includes the 
effect of lagged taxes.  Thus, our test cannot rule out that time consistent smokers are being made 
better off in the long run, which through serially correlated tobacco taxes appears as an effect of 
the current tax on happiness. 
This discussion suggests a stricter test to distinguish these models: examine the 
immediate, rather than long run, impact of taxes on happiness.  But doing so increases our data 
requirements dramatically.  To measure the average effect over time, all we require is that, 
summed over all periods before and after a tax changes in a state, we have sufficient observations 
to identify an impact of a tax change.  But, to examine an immediate impact requires having data 
in one period on enough observations to distinguish the impact of taxation.  This is impossible in 
the U.S. GSS.  That data has the advantage of many years of data, but the typical sample size in 
any year is fewer than 2000 observations, which is then divided over 50 states.  When years are 
pooled, our state specific sample sizes are sufficient to identify average tax effects.  But 
identifying immediate effects is impossible. 
The Canadian GSS, however, does permit this comparison.  Our Canadian GSS data have 
between 9300 and 27,600 observations per year.  Moreover, these are divided over only 10 
provinces, so that the average province/year cell size is over 2000 observations.  Thus, we can 
aggregate these data to the province/year level and estimate changes regressions that allow us to 
examine immediate impacts of tax changes. 
To do so, we divide our Canadian GSS sample into those likely and unlikely to smoke;  
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the former group is composed of those above the 75
th percentile of the predicted smoker 
distribution (a 41% chance of smoking or greater), while the latter is composed of those below 
the 25
th percentile (a 19% chance of smoking or smaller).  We then compute the mean level of 
unhappiness and excise taxes for each predicted smoker group in each province in each survey 
year, and regress the change in mean happiness on the change in mean excise taxes separately for 
each group, including a full set of year dummies to capture time trends.   For predicted smokers, 
this changes regression yields a coefficient of –0.044 (0.016).  This result confirms that, for 
predicted smokers, there is a short-run negative effect of higher taxes on unhappiness; when 
taxes rise, happiness falls.  For predicted non-smokers, on the other hand, we obtain an 
insignificant estimate of –0.009 (0.008), confirming the causal interpretation of our finding for 
predicted smokers. 
Thus, it appears that the impact of taxes on unhappiness does occur in the short run, 
which is consistently only with the sophisticated time inconsistent model.  Of course, even this 
evidence is not dispositive, as our differences are taken over one or more years.  If the costs of 
quitting are high enough and/or discount rates are high enough, even within one year a time 
consistent smoker could be made better off from reducing smoking.  But the overall pattern of 
findings remains much more consistent with the time consistent alternative than with the rational 
addiction model. 
 
Part VI: Conclusions 
The results in this paper have potentially important implications for how policy makers 
should view smoking in general and cigarette taxes in particular.  In particular, they suggest that  
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smokers themselves may be made better off by cigarette taxes. This result is inconsistent with 
several rational views of smoking that would view such a tax as a pure hindrance on smokers, 
and more consistent with behavioral time-inconsistent models in which these taxes may serve as 
self-control devices.   
The methodology used in this paper should also have broader interest. Economists are 
often concerned with welfare, with how policies affect the happiness of people.  Yet there are 
few tools for empirically assessing welfare.  In the case of smoking, as with many other 
behaviors, behavioral reactions to changes in the environment can only provide limited insight 
into the welfare implications of policy interventions.  Theories that have very different policy 
implications can accommodate a variety of behaviors and, as a consequence, empirical work on 
behavioral responses can leave us in the dark about welfare.   
Subjective well-being measures provide a possible way to directly address welfare 
questions.  As our analysis shows, this direct approach is empirically feasible. Happiness 
measures may be noisy, but in our case at least, they contain sufficient signal to discern effects of 
moderate size policies.  This is heartening because happiness data is abundant. In the US, the 
GSS is available in moderately large samples for many years.  Looking beyond the US, the 
Canada data we use is not the exception but rather the rule: many countries, notably in Europe, 
collect cross-sections and panel data on happiness.  In short, the results in this paper suggest that 
by using happiness data, economists may be able to directly assess the impacts of public policy 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 US  Data  Canadian Data 
  All Smoker?  All Smoker? 
   No  Yes  No  Yes 
Report "Very Happy"  0.320  0.355  0.277  0.588  0.720  0.646 
  (.466) (.479) (.448)  (.492) (.449) (.478) 
Report "Pretty Happy" (US) or "Somewhat   0.554  0.543  0.559  0.338  0.226  0.281 
Happy"  (Canada)  (.497) (.498) (.497)  (.473) (.418) (.450) 
Report "Not Too Happy" (US) or   0.119  0.091  0.152  0.050  0.044  0.064 
“Unhappy”  (Canada)  (.323) (.288) (.359)  (.217) (.205) (.245) 
Real Tax Rate  0.316  0.280  0.278  1.170  1.227  1.211 
  (.158) (.115) (.117)  (.394) (.494) (.490) 
Predicted  Smoker  0.352 0.298 0.456  0.300 0.247 0.365 
  (.190) (.171) (.174)  (.154) (.147) (.148) 
Smoke?  0.352 0.000 1.000  0.276 0.000 1.000 
  (.478)     (.447)    
White 0.835  0.844  0.832       
 (.371)  (.363)  (.374)       
Black 0.135  0.128  0.144       
 (.342)  (.334)  (.351)       
Married  0.565 0.583 0.548  0.552 0.543 0.515 
  (.496) (.493) (.498)  (.497) (.498) (.500) 
Separated or Divorced  0.145  0.113  0.191  0.084  0.066  0.126 
  (.353) (.317) (.393)  (.278) (.249) (.331) 
Widowed  0.185 0.179 0.183  0.138 0.204 0.117 
  (.388) (.384) (.387)  (.345) (.403) (.321) 
High School Dropout  0.265  0.247  0.332  0.370  0.389  0.403 
  (.441) (.431) (.471)  (.483) (.488) (.491) 
High School Graduate  0.321  0.317  0.348  0.150  0.136  0.171 
  (.467) (.465) (.476)  (.357) (.343) (.376) 
Some  College  0.217 0.213 0.199  0.147 0.134 0.152 
  (.412) (.410) (.399)  (.354) (.340) (.359) 
College  Graduate  0.194 0.220 0.118  0.301 0.327 0.265 
  (.396) (.414) (.323)  (.459) (.469) (.441) 
Full Time Worker  0.490  0.464  0.536       
 (.500)  (.499)  (.499)       
Part Time Worker  0.101  0.106  0.089       
 (.301)  (.307)  (.284)       
Unemployed 0.029  0.019  0.044       
 (.169)  (.138)  (.206)       
Not in Labor Force  0.344  0.379  0.287       




Church Attendance Index  3.884  4.457  3.076       
  (2.694) (2.676) (2.445)       
Church Attendance 1        0.238  0.281  0.130 
      (.426)  (.450)  (.336) 
Church Attendance 2        0.121  0.122  0.098 
      (.326)  (.328)  (.298) 
Church Attendance 3        0.267  0.248  0.290 
      (.443)  (.432)  (.454) 
Unemployment Rate  9.556  10.396  10.569  6.595  6.833  6.947 
  (2.772) (2.626) (2.698)  (2.113) (1.952) (1.994) 
  36421 10279  5583  100663 35990 13742 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Columns 1-3 are for the US data and column 4-6 are for Canadian data. 
Columns 1 and 4 are full sample means. Columns 2 and 3, and columns 5 and 6, restrict to sample of non-











































Table 2: Relation Between Cigarette Taxes and Unhappiness 
   Very Happy   Pretty 
Happy  Not Happy  Very 
Happy 
 Somewhat 
Happy   Unhappy
  US Data  Canadian Data 
Tax  -0.027  -0.005  0.032  0.000 0.013 0.000 
  (.033) (.034)  (.020)  (.029) (.023) (.011) 
Predicted  Smoking  -0.069  -0.014  0.075  0.198 0.194 0.096 
  (.038) (.040)  (.026)  (.051) (.055) (.040) 
Predicted Smoking*Tax  0.047  0.109  -0.156  0.072  -0.058  -0.048 
  (.078) (.070)  (.045)  (.062) (.052) (.020) 
Married 0.176  -0.079  -0.095  0.118  -0.098  -0.020 
  (.009) (.011)  (.008)  (.005) (.004) (.004) 
Separated/Divorced 0.022  -0.020  -0.005  -0.029  -0.025  0.023 
  (.009) (.012)  (.009)  (.008) (.009) (.004) 
Widowed 0.036  0.005  -0.041  -0.010  -0.034  0.023 
  (.012) (.015)  (.010)  (.009) (.009) (.004) 
High School Dropout  0.053  0.011  0.029  0.135  0.144  0.022 
  (.049) (.042)  (.028)  (.013) (.018) (.005) 
High School Graduate  0.052  0.032  0.007  0.191  0.123  0.012 
  (.047) (.043)  (.028)  (.014) (.019) (.004) 
Some  College  0.055 0.037  0.000  0.210 0.124 0.015 
  (.049) (.047)  (.029)  (.021) (.014) (.005) 
College  Graduate  0.064 0.023  0.003  0.220 0.135 0.017 
  (.046) (.046)  (.030)  (.027) (.017) (.003) 
Father High School   0.002  0.007  -0.008       
Dropout (.004)  (.005)  (.004)       
Mother High School   -0.007  0.007  0.001       
Dropout (.007)  (.007)  (.005)       
Father High School   0.006  0.016  -0.020       
Graduate (.007)  (.008)  (.005)       
Mother High School   0.004  0.007  -0.009       
Graduate (.008)  (.010)  (.006)       
Father Some College  0.009  0.000  -0.009       
 (.012)  (.011)  (.007)       
Mother Some College  0.005  0.012  -0.014       
 (.013)  (.014)  (.007)       
Father College Graduate  0.024  -0.001  -0.020       
 (.010)  (.010)  (.007)       
Mother College Graduate  0.029  -0.009  -0.017       
 (.014)  (.013)  (.009)       
Lowest Household Income  -0.044  0.025  0.027  -0.049  0.036  0.021 
Quartile  (.011) (.012)  (.010)  (.023) (.015) (.009) 
2nd Household Income   -0.023  0.045  -0.014  -0.026  0.039  0.001 
Quartile  (.010) (.011)  (.010)  (.011) (.008) (.004) 
















Top Household Income   0.054  -0.001  -0.047  0.048  -0.009  -0.008 
Quartile  (.011) (.010)  (.009)  (.007) (.003) (.003) 
Lowest Personal Income         -0.016  0.029  0.023 
Quartile        (.009) (.007) (.006) 
2nd Personal Income         -0.018  0.018  0.015 
Quartile        (.007) (.005) (.003) 
3rd Personal Income         0.007  0.013  -0.002 
Quartile        (.006) (.007) (.005) 
Top Personal Income         0.030  0.008  -0.006 
Quartile        (.012) (.006) (.002) 
White -0.004  0.031  -0.020       
 (.016)  (.013)  (.009)       
Black -0.084  0.041  0.043       
 (.016)  (.014)  (.014)       
One Child  -0.029  0.016  0.018       
 (.008)  (.009)  (.005)       
Two Children  -0.017  0.002  0.020       
 (.007)  (.009)  (.005)       
Three Children  -0.033  0.012  0.027       
 (.008)  (.010)  (.006)       
Four Children  -0.018  0.004  0.020       
 (.011)  (.012)  (.009)       
Five or More Children  -0.021  0.005  0.020       
 (.011)  (.010)  (.008)       
Household Size 2        0.014  -0.011  -0.010 
        (.013) (.013) (.006) 
Household Size 3        -0.005  0.001  -0.013 
        (.008) (.006) (.003) 
Household Size 4+        0.003  0.004  -0.013 
        (.011) (.012) (.005) 
Full Time Worker  0.029  0.043  -0.068       
 (.012)  (.014)  (.011)       
Part Time Worker  0.021  0.039  -0.056       
 (.012)  (.014)  (.010)       
Unemployed -0.026  -0.044  0.079       
 (.015)  (.018)  (.017)       
Not In Labor Force  0.032  0.021  -0.050       
 (.011)  (.012)  (.011)       
Ever Worked  0.012  -0.012  0.001       
 (.010)  (.011)  (.007)       
Unemployment Rate  -0.005  0.004  0.001  -0.004  0.005  0.000 




Church Attendance Index  0.016  -0.008  -0.007       
 (.001)  (.001)  (.001)       
Attend Church Weekly        0.147  -0.034  -0.012 
        (.011) (.007) (.007) 
Attend Church Monthly        0.086  -0.011  -0.010 
        (.007) (.009) (.006) 
Attend Church Annually        0.039  0.004  -0.009 
Or  Less        (.013) (.010) (.002) 
Born in Canada        0.031  -0.016  -0.012 
        (.010) (.004) (.005) 
Live in House        0.036  0.006  0.013 
        (.011) (.009) (.005) 
Live in Apartment        0.038  0.023  0.017 
        (.009) (.007) (.001) 
Own Dwelling?        0.065  0.018  -0.011 
        (.012) (.002) (.002) 
Speak English at Home        -0.015  0.008  -0.001 
        (.019) (.018) (.003) 
Age*Sex  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sample  Size  36421  36421 36421  100663 100663 100663 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating which answer people chose to a happinerss question. 
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is the dummy for people reporting "very happy", in column (2) it 
is the dummy for people reporting being "pretty happy" (2) or "somewhat happy" (4) and in columns 3 and 6 it 
is the dummy for people reporting being "not happy" (3) or "unhappy" (6).  Standard errors, which are corrected 
to allow for grouped error terms at the state-level, are in parenthesis. The variable "Predicted Smoking" is a 
continuous variable denoting the predicted smoking level.  The first three columns use US data while the second 











Table 3: Robustness Checks 
Panel A: US Data 
Tax 0.032  0.033  0.036  0.070  0.015 
 (.020)  (.020)  (.022)  (.021)  (.022) 
Predicted  Smoking  0.075 -0.006  0.011 0.073 -0.190 
 (.026)  (.036)  (.059)  (.025)  (.025) 
Predicted  Smoking*Tax  -0.156 -0.152  -0.167  -0.152 -0.104 
  (.045) (.049)  (.046) (.042) (.077) 
         
Panel B: Canadian Data 
Tax 0.000  0.000  0.010  0.018  0.003 
 (.011)  (.011)  (.009)  (.016)  (.015) 
Predicted Smoking  0.096  0.072  0.180  0.097  0.096 
 (.040)  (.061)  (.061)  (.040)  (.051) 
Predicted  Smoking*Tax  -0.048 -0.048  -0.082  -0.048 -0.057 
  (.020) (.021)  (.026) (.020) (.031) 
                
Demographic Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Predicted Smoking*Unemployment Rate  No  Yes  No  No  No 
State  Dummies*Trend  No No  Yes  No No 
Predicted Smoking*Trend  No  No  No  Yes  No 
State Dummies*Pred Smoking  No  No  No  No  Yes 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis and are corrected to allow for correlation within states.  "Predicted 
Smoking*Unemployment Rate" means that the effect of predicted smoking was allowed to depend on the 
unemployment rate in the state. "State Dummies*Trend" means each state was allowed to have its own linear 
time trend.  “Predicted Smoking*Trend” means that the regression includes an interaction of predicted smoking 
with a linear time trend.  "State Dummies*PredSmoking" means that predicted smoking was allowed to have a 
























Notes: The depent vaiable in each column is a dummy for unhappiness. "Other Tax" refers to a different tax in 
each column. It refers to a beer or alcohol tax in column (1), gas tax in column (2), sales tax in column (3) and 
Total state/province revenues in column (4). 
 
Table 4: "Effect" of Other Taxes 
Panel A: US Data 
  Beer Tax  Gas Tax  Sales Tax  Total Revenues
Cigarette Tax  0.038  0.035  0.033  0.029 
 (.024)  (.020)  (.020)  (.019) 
Other Tax  -0.017  -0.001  0.003  -0.004 
 (.008)  (.001)  (.004)  (.023) 
Predicted Smoking  0.055  0.060  0.060  0.125 
 (.031)  (.048)  (.033)  (.038) 
Predicted Smoking*Cigarette Tax  -0.181  -0.162  -0.159  -0.144 
  (.055) (.043) (.045)  (.043) 
Predicted Smoking*OtherTax  0.034  0.001  0.003  -0.037 
 (.014)  (.003)  (.006)  (.021) 
        
Panel B: Canadian Data 
  Beer Tax  Gas Tax  Sales Tax  Total Revenues
Cigarette Tax  0.003  0.008  0.004  0.002 
 (.008)  (.006)  (.010)  (.009) 
Other Tax  -0.006  -0.002  -0.004  -0.006 
 (.002)  (.001)  (.001)  (.004) 
Predicted Smoking  0.082  0.072  0.067  0.059 
 (.048)  (.044)  (.041)  (.034) 
Predicted Smoking*Cigarette Tax  -0.045  -0.047  -0.048  -0.049 
  (.020) (.021) (.019)  (.020) 
Predicted Smoking*OtherTax  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.009 
 (.002)  (.001)  (.001)  (.007) 
        
Demographic Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Table 5: Effect by Demographic Group 
Panel A: US Data 











Tax  -0.016  0.075 0.006 -0.043 0.047 0.109 0.104 0.054  0.132 
  (.038)  (.021) (.095) (.054) (.039) (.026) (.027) (.041) (.037) 
Predicted  Smoking  0.076  0.071 0.024 0.076 0.092 0.076 0.061 0.075 0.075 
  (.044)  (.038) (.098) (.057) (.053) (.041) (.043) (.058) (.051) 
Predicted  Smoking*Tax  -0.102  -0.219 -0.006 -0.141 -0.224 -0.258 -0.194 -0.201 -0.226 
  (.076)  (.065) (.203) (.100) (.093) (.079) (.044) (.064) (.052) 
Spouse's Predicted Smoking              0.046  0.066  0.002 
          (.082)  (.132)  (.139) 
Sp.Predicted Smoking*Tax          -0.126 -0.066 -0.095 
          (.072) (.105) (.116) 
            
            
Panel B: Canadian Data 







Females      
Tax  -0.001 -0.004  -0.005   0.001 -0.019 0.007       
  (.015)  (.014)  (.018) (.019) (.019) (.014)       
Predicted Smoking  0.171  0.050  0.180  0.203  -0.038  0.131       
  (.042)  (.051)  (.042) (.048) (.058) (.068)       
Predicted Smoking*Tax  -0.072  -0.012  -0.095  -0.059  0.017  -0.034      
  (.017)  (.030)  (.028) (.032) (.038) (.028)      
              
Demographic  Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis and are corrected to allow for correlation within states. The first column includes only single people, the 
second and seventh column includes only married people, the third includes only single males, the fourth column includes only single females, the 
fifth and eighth only married males and the sixth and ninth only married females.   Columns 7-9 include the spouse's predicted smoking, both direct 
and interacted with the cigarette tax as controls. 